Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 12

10-1-1977

Criminal Conspiracy in Canada
Terence Arnold

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Terence Arnold, “Criminal Conspiracy in Canada”, Book Review of Criminal Conspiracy in Canada by
Matthew R. Goode, (1977-1978) 4:1 DLJ 212.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Reviews
Criminal Conspiracy in Canada. By Matthew R. Goode. Toronto:
The Carswell Company Limited, 1975. Pp. xxix, 255. Price:
$28.50
Criminal Conspiracy in Canada "is primarily intended to provide
the practitioner of criminal law in Canada with a guide through the
maze of law surrounding the inchoate crime called criminal
conspiracy"(p.iii). This intention has been realized. Professor
Goode has presented a thorough, clear and well-documented
account of the intricacies of his subject as they are likely to affect a
conspiracy trial. And intricate the subject is, because the nature of
the offence is difficult to define, and because the evidentiary and
procedural problems which attend the conspiracy trial are easily
susceptible to misunderstanding and confusion.
Following a brief overview of the history of the conspiracy
offence, Professor Goode begins his examination of the physical
and mental elements of the crime. He quickly identifies a central
conceptual problem in asserting that "the question of evidentiary
matters constantly intrudes in any discussion of the actus reus,
particularly in the courts, and is largely responsible for the dearth of
definition of the actus reus" (p. 9). The problem, in other words, is
confusion between the evidentiary basis upon which a conspiracy
can be said to exist and the nature of the conspiratorial agreement
itself. The result is the absence of a basic definition of the actus reus
of conspiracy. The meanings of "agreement", and frequently
proffered synonyms for agreement (such as "common design") are
assumed by the courts. When is the relationship between persons
such that it can be said that there is agreement between them? In
answering this question, the courts have tended to rely upon
assertions in the negative about the circumstances in which an
agreement may be inferred. Conspirators need not know the identity
of one another, and they need not have met, or consulted with or
spoken to those with whom they conspire.' These assertions do not
resolve the problem of definition. Nor do the metaphors which
I. R. v. McCutcheon (1916), 25 C.C.C. 310 (Ont. S.C.); R. v. Fellowes (1859),
19 U.C.Q.B. 48; Meyrick and Ribuffi v. The King (1929), 21 Cr. App. R. 94; 45
T.L.R. 421 (C.C.A.);R. v. Murphy (1837), 8 Car. & P. 297; 173 E.R. 502 (Q.B.)
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describe the different types of conspiracies according to the
organization or hierarchy of the criminal enterprise: "Wheels",
"chains", and "cartwheels", have all been used to describe
conspiratorial organizations. 2 It is not clear that the use of such
metaphors is limited to what may be a useful illustrative purpose. It
may be that a pattern of conduct or the internal hierarchy of an
organization or enterprise can be likened to a "chain" or a
"wheel". It does not follow, however, that once a "chain" or
"wheel" type of organization is established, the preconcert of its
members in relation to a single purpose is an irresistible inference.
Professor Goode does not offer a definition of agreement, but he
does make some necessary distinctions:
It is clear that conspiratorial agreement is not mere acquiescence
in or knowledge of the plan; it is not a formal agreement in any
way; it may be tacit or express; it is less demanding than
contractual agreement, and it is more than criminal negotiation
(p. 16).
It may be added, however, that the courts should explicitly and in
positive terms set out the characteristics of agreement. There is,
after all, no magic in the word. An agreement is a decision, made by
the parties to the agreement, to pursue the object of a common
intention. The agreement is a conspiracy if the object is unlawful.
This is the essential question which the trier of fact must answer.
The circumstances from which an agreement may be inferred, and
the metaphors to which an organization may be likened, are but aids
in answering the essential question. They are not substitutes for the
answer.
Professor Goode's discussion of the mens rea of conspiracy is
mainly directed to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. O'Brien3 and that of the House of Lords in Churchill v.
Walton. 4 O'Brien raises the question whether an alleged conspirator
must have "an intent to agree, as distinguished from an intent to
carry out the unlawful purpose" (p. 19), and the author suggests
that O'Brien is not clear on this issue. One would think it safe to
assume that, minimally, an intent to agree would be required, at
least in looking, upon agreement in a narrow sense as mere
2. Meyrick and Ribuffi v. The King, id. A caution against the use of such
metaphors is given by Roskill L.J. inR. v. Ardalan, [1972] 2 All E.R. 257; [1972]
I W.L.R. 463; 56 Cr. App. R. 320 (C.C.A.)
3. [1954] S.C.R. 666; [1955] 2 D.L.R. 311; 110 C.C.C. I
4. [1967] 2 A.C. 224; [1967] 1 All E.R. 497; 51 Cr. App. R. 212 (H.L.(E.))

214 The Dalhousie Law Journal

signification, verbal or otherwise, of concurrence. O'Brien could
then be relied upon in support of the proposition that the intention to
agree must be sincere, that is, the parties must also intend to
participate in the common purpose with a view to achieving its
object.
A more difficult problem is the nature of the mens rea required
when the object of the conspiracy is a strict liability offence. This
problem has been discussed in a line of English cases 5 and, in 1967,
the House of Lords ruled that persons may be convicted of such a
conspiracy only if what they agreed to do was, on the facts known to
them, an unlawful act. The problem has not arisen in Canada
because, as Professor Goode points out, most strict liability
offences are found outside the Code and, until recently, it was not
clear that "unlawful purpose" in section 423(2) extended to
unlawful objects outside the Code. Hopefully, Professor Goode is
correct in his prophecy that Canadian courts will follow the
Churchill decision. Strict liability may have a rationale of its own
when considered, as it is for the most part, apart from the moral
implications of criminal liability. It may be true in England, as
pointed out by Asquith J. in R. v. Clayton, that conspiracy does not
in itself carry particularly wicked connotations. 6 Such is not the
case in Canada where conspiracy is defined as an indictable offence
with punishment of imprisonment for up to two years. It is serious
enough that our criminal law enables certain conduct to be cast in a
more serious light solely because it is done by two or more persons
rather than by one alone. To allow this to be done when the object is
an offence of strict liability without requiring proof of knowledge
would be an unfortunate extension of the conspiracy offence.
The scope of the unlawful act requirement is the most important
issue raised by the law of criminal conspiracy. The objects of
conspiracy are defined, in some cases, quite narrowly in that the
agreement involves pursuit of a specific criminal offence. But
section 423(2) proscribes conspiracies to effect unlawful purposes.
It has been accepted that the scope of "unlawful purpose" extends
beyond offences in the Criminal Code to include other criminal
offences and to breaches of provincial and even municipal law. 7
Infractions of non-criminal laws may thus be elevated to indictable
5. R. v. Clayton (1943), 33 Cr. App. R. 113; 65 T.L.R. 329n (C.C.A.);R. v.
Sorsky, [1944] 2 All E.R. 333; 30 Cr. App. R. 84 (C.C.A.)
6. (1943), 33 Cr. App. R. 113; 65 T.L.R. 329n
7. R. v. Chapman and Grange, [1973] 2 O.R. 290; 34 D.L.R. (3d) 510; 11
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conspiracies simply because two or more persons have acted in
concert. The question now is whether "unlawful purpose" may
encompass a wider area of unlawful conduct at common law. The
second chapter of Professor Goode's volume focuses on this
question.
The chapter begins with an historical study of the unlawful act
requirement at common law. Conspiracies to commit public
mischief and to commit torts may be charged if, in each case, a
loosely defined public interest is infringed. Professor Goode casts
doubt on the Knuller 8 and Shaw 9 cases as authority for a charge
alleging a conspiracy to corrupt public morals, but this too must be
seen as a possible conspiracy at common law.
Professor Goode is appropriately critical of the vagueness and
uncertainty of the conspiracy offence as it has developed in
England. He then considers whether the common law on conspiracy
applies in Canada and concludes that it may, but that there are sound
arguments to the contrary - at least with respect to the application
of some common law conspiracies. The fact that the CriminalCode
does cover some of the unlawful acts which might furnish the
unlawful purpose at common law, and the expressed preference of
the Supreme Court for well-defined limits to criminal conduct 1 ° can
both be cited in this regard. Notwithstanding these observations, we
are still left with the language of Fauteux J. delivering the judgment
of the Court in Wright v. The Queen: the "wide embracing import
of the term 'unlawful purpose' remains unchanged" - unchanged,
that is, by the 1953-54 amendments which codified common law
conspiracy. 11
A resolution of the possible conflict between section 423(2) and
section 8 would at least clarify the scope of common law conspiracy
in Canada. One possible interpretation of the sections read together,
suggests that, although no person can be convicted of an offence at
common law, a conviction may be registered for a conspiracy to
commit an unlawful act where "unlawful act" may include conduct
C.C.C. (2d) 84 (C.A.); R. v. Jean Talon Fashion Center Inc. (1975), 56 D.L.R.
(3d) 296; 22 C.C.C. (2d) 223 (Que. Q.B.)
8. Knuller v. DPP, [1973] A.C. 435; [1972] 2 All E.R. 898; 56 Cr. App. R. 633
(H.L.(E.))
9. Shaw v. DPP, [1962] A.C. 220; [1961] 2 All E'R. 446; 45 Cr. App. R. 113
(H.L.(E.))
10. Frey v. Fedoruk, [1950] S.C.R. 517; [1950] 3 D.L.R. 513; 97 C.C.C. I
11. [1964] S.C.R. 192 at 194; 43 D.L.R. (2d) 597 at 598; [1964] 2 C.C.C. 201 at
202
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which was unlawful at common law. In the words of Professor
Goode, it is possible that section 8 "prohibits only common law
crimes, not common law definitions" (p. 95). Because substantive
common law offences have been abolished in Canada, this
interpretation means that conduct which is no longer unlawful in
Canada remains unlawful solely as an object of conspiracy. This
interpretation adheres to the letter, if not the spirit of section 8.
The logical answer to the problem of interpreting section 423(2)
lies in the recognition that "agreement" is not an abstract concept.
An agreement is characterized by the object agreed upon, and if the
object is no longer criminal in Canada, the conspiracy should no
longer be criminal. Section 423(2) undermines codification of our
criminal law by providing recourse to a potentially unlimited
common law area of criminal conduct. It is to be hoped that the
sentiments expressed in Frey v. Fedoruk12 will lead our courts to
reject common law developments in the area of conspiracy.
In chapter three, Professor Goode discusses three problems on the
subject of parties to conspiracy: conspiracies involving a husband
and wife alone and with others, inconsistent verdicts in conspiracy
cases and companies as parties to a conspiracy. The law with
respect to the first and third problems is settled and fully discussed
by the author. The second problem is not as easily subject to only
passing comment. From the requirement that a conspiracy as an
agreement requires the concurrence of two or more persons, a
difficulty sometimes arises in reconciling the verdicts reached in the
case of one or more participants. Governing principles have yet to
be determined in Canada and some of the recent cases reveal a
continuing concern with formal consistency on the face of the
record, 13 perhaps at the expense of ensuring logical consistency in
the actual result.
The rule which empowered the courts to quash a conviction
where there was an inconsistency or repugnancy on the face of the
record was not born of a logical attempt to deal with the problem of
inconsistency. It was, rather, a limited basis of appellate redress at a
time when the bases for appeal were far more limited than they now
are. 14 The justification for the rule may have rested more on public
policy considerations, and the courts' insistence that justice should
12. [1950] S.C.R. 517; [195013 D.L.R. 513; 97 C.C.C. 1
13. See, for example, R. v. Funnell, [1972] 2 O.R. 301; 6 C.C.C. (2d) 215
(C.A.); R. v. Ellis, [1972] 2 O.R. 306; 6 C.C.C. (2d) 220 (C.A.)
14. The history of the rule is reviewed in the judgment of the House of Lords in
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be seen to be done, than on logic. The apparent absurdity in the
conviction of only one conspirator and the acquittal of one or more
others who allegedly conspired with him required either that an
explanation be given as to why this result was possible, or that the
apparent repugnancy be removed from the record. Because the
former was not possible on the limited material before the appeal
court, the latter inevitably became the approach to the problem of
inconsistency. 15
The problem of inconsistent verdicts is unique in conspiracy
cases simply because more than one person must be involved for the
offence to take place. Generally, inconsistent verdicts of joint
participants is not a ground for quashing a conviction. 1 6 But
conspiracy is an offence in which the convictions of the participants
may be interdependent. If one alleged conspirator is convicted and
another or others are acquitted, the courts should be in a position to
determine whether there is inconsistency in this result. Upon the
17
present bases of appeal, there is ample scope for this to be done.
Professor Goode views the recent decision of the House of Lords in
DPP v. Shannon1 8 as recognition of this and as a significant
improvement in the law on inconsistent verdicts. Shannon
represents a rejection of the narrow approach to inconsistency on the
basis of the record. At the same time, the House of Lords may have
gone too far in the opposite direction in the belief that the evidence
against each accused will be the determining factor, thus
overlooking the logical interdependence of some conspiracy
convictions.
Professor Friedland has offered a test whereby a conviction
would be quashed (where the issue of inconsistent verdicts is raised)
"only when the verdicts make the appeal court suspicious whether
the jury properly understood the issues or the evidence" .19 This
would be an appropriate test in approaching the problem of
inconsistency in conspiracy cases. It is sufficiently broad to take
account of the imaginable circumstances in which it might be unsafe
DPP v. Shannon, [1975] A.C. 717; [1974] 2 All E.R. 1009; 59 Cr. App. R. 250
(H.L.(E.))
15. See particularly the judgment of Lord Salmon in DPP v. Shannon, id. at 770;
[197412 All E.R. at 1048; 59 Cr. App. R. at 274
16. M. L. Friedland, Issue Estoppel in Criminal Cases (1966-67), 9 Criminal L.Q.
163 at 200
17. Criminal Code, s. 603
18. [1975] A.C. 717; [1974] 2 All E.R. 1009; 59 Cr. App. R. 250
19. Friedland, supra, note 18 at 205
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to allow different verdicts with respect to co-conspirators to stand,
and yet is not so narrow as to require at least two alleged
conspirators to be convicted in every case in which two or more are
charged. One difficulty with the test is the suggestion that it would
only apply "in a case where both were tried by the same jury; it
would not apply to trial by different juries or when one of the
accused pleaded guilty and his co-participant was later
acquitted". 2 0 However, Professor Friedland goes on to say that "in
all cases there would have to be sufficient evidence that the
principal offence was committed . . ., or that the co-conspirator is
also guilty" . 2 1 Recognition is thereby given to the interdependence
of participant guilt and to the fact that different verdicts in different
trials may require scrutiny in order to determine whether the
conspiracy offence has been committed. It is suggested that
Professor Friedland's test offers the most reliable guide to the
problem of inconsistency in conspiracy cases.
Modern communications are such that conspirators can plot from
many different locations to perform acts in other locations.
Professor Goode's discussion of jurisdiction over conspiracy
focuses on jurisdiction over an agreement made within the territory
to commit an offence outside, and the converse situation of
jurisdiction over an agreement made outside the jurisdiction to
pursue an illegal object within. The two most important cases
bearing on this subject are the decisions of the House of Lords in
Board of Trade v. Owen 2 2 and DPP v. Doot.2 3 In the former, it was
held that a conspiracy in England to commit a crime outside
England was not indictable unless the contemplated crime is one for
which an indictment would lie in England. In Doot, the House held
that a conspiracy formed abroad to commit a crime in England is
indictable in England.
On the few occasions when Canadian courts have had
opportunities to deal with the problem of jurisdiction in conspiracy,
they have not expressly adopted Owen and Doot. Professor Goode
suggests that the reasoning in both cases would find favour in this
country. It may be unnecessary to speculate further on the question
as section 423 of the Code now includes jurisdictional rules for
conspiracy cases. Section 423(3) fixes the situs of a conspiracy in
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. [1957] A.C. 602; [1957] 1 All E.R. 411;41 Cr. App. R. 11 (H.L. (E.))
23. [1973] A.C. 807; [1973] 1 All E.R. 940; 57 Cr. App. R. 600 (H.L. (E.))
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Canada for the purpose of indicting a party who, while in Canada,
conspires with anyone to effect a purpose outside Canada which is
an offence under section 423 and under the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction concerned. Subsection 4 deems a conspiracy formed
abroad to commit an offence under section 423 in Canada to have
been formed in Canada. Subsection 5 allows a section 423(3) or
423(4) conspiracy to be tried in the place in Canada where the
accused is found.
In chapter five, Professor Goode analyses the procedural
problems involved in situations where an accused faces a conspiracy
charge and a substantive offence arising from the pursuit of the
conspiracy. Several cases which illustrate the different variations of
the problem are discussed. Possible limits to joinder are considered
and judicial objections to the practice are reviewed. The author's
argument that Kienapple24 may apply to conspiracy and the
substantive offence is of particular interest because of its possible
dramatic effect on current joinder practice and procedure. A useful
summary of conclusions to the joinder problem is found at the end
of the chapter.
Professor Goode's volume is concluded by a note on evidence in
conspiracy cases. In particular, the author examines the degree of
proof necessary for conviction and the effect of a peculiar
conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule.
The frequent reliances upon circumstantial evidence in proof of
conspiracy brings into play the operation of the rule in Hodge's
Case. 2 5 The problem here arises from the Supreme Court decision
in Mitchell26 to the effect that circumstantial evidence of intent does
not have to satisfy Baron Alderson's test in Hodge's Case. Spence
J. stated that planning and deliberation were mental processes, and
that conclusions respecting them were always based on circumstantial evidence. The rule in Hodge's Case was concerned only "with
evidence as to the commission of an act". 27 But, as Professor
Goode points out, the "act" of conspiracy involves reference to a
state of mind. Does Mitchell apply where proof of the act involves
reference to a state of mind? Surely it makes little sense to suggest
(as in R. v. Landriault2 8) that the test demanded by Hodge's Case
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

[1975] 1 S.C.R. 729; 44 D.L.R. (3d) 351; 15 C.C.C. (2d) 524; 26 C.R.N.S. 1
(1838), 2 Lewin. 227; 168 E.R. 1136
[1964] S.C.R. 471; 46 D.L.R. (2d) 384; 47 W.W.R. 591
Id. at 478; 46 D.L.R. (2d) at 393; 47 W.W.R. at 601
[1968] 1 O.R. 284; [196812 C.C.C. 379 (C.A.)
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applies to the act of agreement but not to the intent. Where, as in
Mitchell, the act is a demonstrable physical occurrence, it is
reasonable to make the distinction. The question of intent can be
readily distinguished and subjected to a different test, or a different
illustration of the reasonable doubt principle, whichever Hodge's
Case may be. This is not so when the charge is conspiracy. The
formation of an agreement is an act of the intellect on the part of
each party to the agreement. Although there may be verbal
expressions or other manifestations of concurrence, the existence of
an unlawful agreement can only be established by indirect evidence.
Both Professor Goode and the authorities preserve a distinction
between direct evidence and indirect evidence of agreement, but the
basis of any suggestion that a conspiracy can be proved directly is
questionable. Even when a conspirator appears as a witness, he can
testify directly only to his own intention and demonstration of
concurrence, and to manifestations of a conspiracy - to other
expressions of agreement and the acts done or words spoken in
pursuing the unlawful object. But no one can see or otherwise
directly experience the formation of a conspiracy.
Professor Goode's discussion of the co-conspirator's exception to
the hearsay rule is of considerable assistance to those concerned
with the peculiarities of evidence in conspiracy cases. The
exception is simple enough to state:
.. . evidence of acts and declarations made by one conspirator
may be used in evidence against another conspirator if, and only
if, (a) the act or declaration is one made 'in furtherance of' the
conspiracy, and (b) the act or declaration has been accompanied
by independent proof of the conspiracy and of the adherence to it
by the actor and declarer (p. 245).
The agency rationale for the exception is questionable, in the
author's view, and the requirements that the hearsay must be "in
furtherance of' the conspiracy is ill-defined. It is difficult to
consider the erratic application of the exception apart from problems
with the hearsay area in general, and the author concludes that only
codification can provide the needed certainty in this area of the law.
Professor Goode's Criminal Conspiracy in Canada is a
significant contribution to Canadian legal literature. Until this book,
the conspiracy offence has been a "hot stove" in the sense that no
one showed an inclination to put his hands on this area of the law, to
wrestle with its finer points and problems, and to write a substantial
work on this very difficult subject. More can be said about the
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offence. Indeed the rationale for the continued existence of the
conspiracy offence should be critically evaluated, and the
application of the crime in a historical and political context invites
further research and study. But Professor Goode has made an
important contribution to our understanding of the law of criminal
conspiracy.
Peter MacKinnon
College of Law
University of Saskatchewan

Superior Orders in National and International Law. By L. C.
Green. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1976. Pp. xix, 374. Price: $25.75
War crimes trials of enemy soldiers seem to be a matter of vogue.
They were very popular after the Second World War, and the
landmark cases, particularly the two international trials at
Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as the so-called subsequent
proceedings at Nuremberg, have had a tremendous impact on the
evolution of the international law of armed conflict. Yet, since the
late 1940s, enthusiasm for such trials has diminished to a vanishing
point among lawyers and laymen alike. Only one famous trial has
taken place in the intervening period, namely, that of Adolph
Eichmann in Israel. But this trial related to the same war, and, in
fact, was confined to genocide and crimes against humanity, as
distinct from war crimes in the strict juridical meaning of the term.
Other opportunities to institute legal proceedings against war
criminals were missed. Not that charges of war crimes have not
been made (or even traded) in the various wars of the last three
decades. Korea, Vietnam and Bangladesh are illustrative instances
which immediately come to mind. Still, in the final analysis, none
of the accusations was put to a judicial test.
In some individual cases, certain countries admittedly brought to
trial persons from amongst their own armed forces who had
committed acts amounting to war crimes. Lieutenant Calley's court
martial in the United States is an obvious example. But these
proceedings scarcely count inasmuch as, legally speaking, the
defendants were charged with offences under national rather than
international law, and, realistically speaking, no state is too anxious
to punish its own soldiers for "excesses" committed against the
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enemy in time of war. When a country prosecutes members of its
armed forces for criminal acts directed at enemy life or property, it
appears to be sitting in judgment over itself.
Why, then, are war crimes trials directed at the enemy so
unpopular at the present time? Essentially, because it is equally hard
to trust a belligerent party to conduct an impartial trial against the
opponent's soldiers. The tendency to exculpate the misdeeds of
one's own soldiers is complemented by the corresponding urge to
condemn the enemy. This is particularly true during hostilities: as
long as war is raging, the atmosphere is not exactly conducive to a
fair trial of members of the armed forces of the other side (not to
mention the difficulties inherent in any serious attempt to collect the
evidence, examine the witnesses, etc.). Even at the termination of
hostilities, trials of enemy war criminals are often suspect: many
observers believe (rightly or wrongly) that the opponent's soldiers
are presumed to be guilty until proved innocent.
Thus, war crimes trials seem to present an inescapable dilemma:
whether held by the home country or by the enemy state, justice,
even if done, does not appear to be done. The only effective way to
cope with the problem is to entrust such trials to an international
penal tribunal. Precedents for the operation of international military
tribunals are to be found in the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings.
However, these trials had been held on an ad hoc basis and the
tribunals concluded their specific functions. Besides, in view of the
fact that they had been set up by the victors against the vanquished,
the proceedings were subjected to (largely spurious) accusations of
partiality. The only solution lies in the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court, which will be available whenever the
need arises. But, at present (as in the past), support for the idea
emanates mainly from jurists and academics. Sovereignty conscious
statesmen and states do not find it appealing at all. So we are back to
square one. Absent the appropriate international machinery, judicial
proceedings against war criminals are usually viewed with distaste.
Nevertheless, the cardinal legal issues dominating war crime
trials have always fascinated lawyers. First and foremost among
these issues is the defence plea of obedience to superior orders,
which is raised in such trials almost as a matter of course. The
importance of the plea actually transcends war crimes trials for it
can be -

and is -

resorted to, both in national and in international

proceedings, whenever a hierarchical system exists in which
subordinates owe obedience to the instructions of their superiors.

Superior Orders in National and International Law

This new book, by Leslie Green, University Professor at the
University of Alberta in Edmonton, deals with the problem of
obedience to superior orders as it has emerged in national and
international law. The book grew out of a report submitted to the
Canadian Department of Justice, and, probably as a result, about
two thirds of the text are devoted to an examination of the national
legal systems of various countries, even though the author is best
known for his previous contributions to international legal studies.
The report antecedents are noticeable in the format of the work as
well as in the fact that there are many lengthy quotations from court
decisions, some several pages long. The book is nonetheless very
comprehensive and entirely up-to-date. There is even a last minute
addendum on the matter of the mercenaries in Angola (pp. 95-6).
The broad practical scope of the book should not detract from the
significance of the theoretical questions analyzed by the author. The
final conclusions of the book (pp. 364-65) appear to be based on a
total disregard of obedience to unlawful orders, except in mitigation
of punishment. The author does adhere to the popular school of
thought, which believes that the real test lies in the "manifest
illegality" of an order or; to use the terminology which he prefers,
its "obvious criminality" (p. 362). Yet, though he entertains doubts
about the possibility of employing unlawful orders which are not
manifestly illegal as a defence against a criminal charge (p. 357), he
finally restricts the role of such orders to the sphere of mitigation of
punishment (p. 365). To my mind, this approach is wrong. I believe
that, whereas obedience to unlawful orders does not constitute a
defence per se, it may be taken into account - together with the
other factual elements of the given case - within the bounds of a
defence based on lack of mens rea, namely, compulsion (duress
under threat or necessity to avoid fatal results in other
circumstances) or mistake (in fact and possibly even in law). In
other words, obedience to unlawful orders may play a role not only
in mitigation of punishment. However, the admissible defence is
compulsion or mistake, whereas obedience to orders should be
regarded as part of the pattern of facts substantiating the presence or
absence of mens rea on the part of the accused.
The main problem relates to the issue of duress. Although the
author states that he has come to the realization that "the plea of
superior orders was inextricably interwoven with those of duress
and necessity" (p. viii), he seems to pay no heed to duress in his
concluding chapter entitled "The Way Ahead" (pp. 354-65). This
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is particularly unsatisfactory in the light of the thorough
examination to which the question of duress as a defence in murder
trials has recently been subjected in three separate decisions of the
House of Lords, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The first of these cases is DPP v. Lynch,' which is discussed by
the author (pp. 20-3, 69). Lynch drove a car with three IRA gunmen
who killed a police constable in Belfast. Lynch was charged with
murder as a principal in the second degree. His plea was that he had
been compelled by duress to drive the car. The crux of the issue was
whether the defence of duress was available in principle to an aider
and abettor in a murder case. The House of Lords, by a majority of
three (Lord Morris, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies) to
two (Lord Simon and Lord Kilbrandon), held that duress could
indeed afford a complete defence to anyone charged with murder as
a principal in the second degree.
The second case is Abbott v. The Queen.2 Abbott was a member
of a commune in Trinidad. He took an active and leading part in the
incredibly brutal murder of a girl who had been the mistress of one
of the inmates of the commune: she was first stabbed and then
buried alive. Abbott was charged with murder as a principal in the
first degree. He too submitted that his participation in the acts
resulting in the girl's death was due to duress. The Privy Council,
again by a majority of three (Lord Salmon, Lord Hailsham and Lord
Kilbrandon) to two (Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies),
held that duress is not available as a defence to anyone charged with
murder as a principal in the first degree.
The last case is R. v. Paquette.3 Paquette drove two other persons
on their way to commit a robbery in Ottawa, in the course of which
an innocent bystander was killed. Paquette was charged with
non-capital murder. His contention was that he participated in the
robbery (by driving) only because he was forced to do it. The
Supreme Court of Canada, in a judgment delivered by Martland J.,
in interpreting the Criminal Code, relied on the Lynch decision and
held that the defence of duress was available in such circumstances.
The incidence of three major judgments relating to duress in less
than two years is quite exceptional. It is noteworthy, however, that
1. [1975] A.C. 653; [1975] 1 All E.R. 913 (H.L.(N.I.))
2. [1976] 3 All E.R. 140; 63 Cr. App. R. 241 (P.C.) (Trin.)
3. (1976), 70 D.L.R. (3d) 129; 30 C.C.C. (2d) 417 (S.C.C.)
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duress was rejected as a matter of law in one of the three (Abbott).
And, on retrial in the decisive case of Lynch, following upon the
House of Lords' ruling, the jury rejected the defence of duress on
the facts and Lynch was again convicted of murder. 4 Thus, duress is
still limited in its application: it is never available to defendants
charged with murder as principals in the first degree, and even
aiders and abettors cannot easily benefit from it. All the same, in
some instances persons who are compelled to commit offences may
be acquitted: Paquette is a good example.
Evidently, the three cases serve as precedents only within the
ambit of the national legal systems involved. But the Privy Council
did not ignore the related problem arising in the context of
international law. It was stated in the Abbott case by Lord Salmon
delivering the advice of the Privy Council:
In the trials of those responsible for wartime atrocities such as
mass killings of men, women or children, inhuman experiments
on human beings, often resulting in death, and like crimes, it was
invariably argued for the defence that these atrocities should be
excused on the ground that they resulted from superior orders and
duress: if the accused had refused to do these dreadful things,
they would have been shot and therefore they should be acquitted
and allowed to go free. This argument has always been
universally rejected. Their Lordships would be sorry indeed to
see it accepted by the common law of England. 5
This passage reflects accurately existing international law. No
degree of duress may justify murder, let alone genocide, of innocent
people. But not all violations of the laws of war consist of
wholesale, or even single acts of, murder. A war criminal may, for
example, be a soldier who plunders property without endangering
human life. If a soldier commits such an act in obedience to
unlawful orders and under duress, there is no reason why this fact
may not be taken into account for the purpose of exemption from
responsibility, as distinct from mere alleviation of sentence.
Whether or not one shares the author's conception of the interplay
of duress and obedience to superior orders, one cannot fail to be
impressed by the wealth of material covered in the book. The
author's erudition enables him to master the intricacies - indeed
the vagaries - of numerous national legal systems which have very
4. Abbott v. The Queen, [1976] 3 All E.R. 140 at 143; 63 Cr. App. R. 241 at 243
5. Id. at 146; 63 Cr. App. R. at 246
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little in common with one another. The book will prove invaluable
to anyone interested in war crimes trials.
Yoram Dinstein
Faculty of Law
University of Toronto

TransnationalLegal Problems, Materials and Text. By Henry J.
Steiner and Detlev F. Vagts. 2d ed. New York: Foundation Press,
1975. Pp. 1427. Price: $23.00
The first edition of Transnational Legal Problems, 147 pages
shorter and $6.50 less expensive than the present one, appeared in
1968. Its publication coincided with that of International Legal
Process' by Abraham Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas
Lowenfeld, a book which introduced a "problem solving"
orientation to International Law teaching. The novel approach of the
latter gained it somewhat more attention in the law reviews, 2 but
Transnational Legal Problems was innovative in its own right.
While Professor Steiner and Vagt's book found inspiration in an
earlier work by Professors Katz and Brewster 3 and continued to
utilise a large number of edited court judgments, the authors
rejected the traditional approach to their subject which concentrated
on the analysis of "rules" of International Law in favour of
considering "problems which transcend national frontiers in some
important way - and suggesting significant relationships among
the different paths towards their solution". 4 Their goals were not to
5
develop a "concept of coherent transnational legal system".
In order to achieve a conceptual unity among the book's thirteen
chapters, its scope was further narrowed by an admitted
concentration on "problems which are directly relevant to the
1. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968)
2. See D. M. Cohen, Review (1969), 8 Colum. J. Transnational L. 173; S.D.
Metzger, Review (1969), I1N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 195; A. P. Rubin, Review
(1971), 12 Harv. Int'l L.J. 382
3. M. Katz and K. Brewster, Law & InternationalTransactions and Relations
(Brooklyn, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1960)
4. H. Steiner and D. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems (Mineola, N.Y.:
Foundation Press, 1968) at xii
5. Id.
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private participant - individual or corporate - in transnational
activities". 6 While the book was not intended to be used in courses
on international transaction technique, its contents treated the
"international movement, protection and regulation of persons or
trade or investment"7 with a stated emphasis in the new edition on
• . .domestic regulatory and constitutional problems involving
foreign affairs; the defense of human rights; the expropriation and
protection of foreign investments; cooperation among national
judiciaries; relationships among national legal systems in fields
of criminal and economic regulation with extraterritorial reach
and the role and activities of multi-national enterprises and
organizations (particularly the European Common Market) (p.

xvi).
As a reviewer, I am in the somewhat unique position of having
taken two courses which used TransnationalLegal Problems from
one of the authors, Detlev Vagts, and also having engaged in private
practice with heavy involvement in transnational legal matters. I
have always found the original edition an excellent source book and
starting point for private transnational problems. Indeed, a number
of my colleagues in the Paris firm with which I practised used it in
the same way. 8 It goes almost without saying that the book is
academically sound and stimulating; and, looking back upon it from
a practical perspective, I can state without hesitation that the book
itself- and a course based on it - has a substantial practical value
as well.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the changes in the second
edition, it might be well to say something about the book's utility in
the Canadian context. From a Canadian law teacher's standpoint,
the book's most serious drawback is its concentration on American
cases and statutes. Most of the material dealing with transnational
problems within national legal systems, the interpenetration of
national and International Law, the role of national judiciaries in
building a transnational legal system, and the transnational reach of
national legal systems utilises American law as its primary focus,
although it would be unfair to neglect mentioning the excellent

6. Id. at xiii

7.Id.
8. Most topic areas, for example, contain precise references to selected books and
articles. Only really pertinent material is cited - there is no "fireworks" display
of vague references to general treatises or articles. Other authors could profit from
this example.
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comparative law footnotes and comments, including some to
Canadian problems. 9
Nevertheless, the book has been used successfully in Canadian
courses in which American legal content is relevant; for example,
the Business School at Dalhousie uses it for its course on legal
aspects of international business. It would have equal utility in a law
course which concentrated on Canadian-American relationships
from the private viewpoint, since it gives such an excellent synopsis
of many American institutions, such as antitrust laws, securities
regulation, and the constitutional system.
Finally, even if the book could not be directly utilised in
Canadian law schools -

and I think it can and should be -

one

hopes that it might be an inspiration for a similar work from the
Canadian viewpoint. That, of course, will not happen until there is a
market for such a book, which can only happen if Canadian
International Law teachers recognize the undoubted need for
teaching their subject from other than the public law perspective. It
is somewhat ironic that, while certain Canadian legal educators
decry the overemphasis on private law subjects in the law schools,
the International Law area is the almost exclusive domain of public
international lawyers. The result is even more ironic in the context
of Canada's undoubted need to generate expertise in the legal side
of her international business relations. Canada's lawyers are being
trained to view international problems as involving peace-keeping
forces rather than trade and investment. This is not to say that
lawyers should not study international legal problems from the
view-point of the Minister for External Affairs. They should. But
commercial economics in the international sphere are also of vital
concern to the nation. A study of Professor Steiner and Vagts' work
provides an excellent starting point for the kind of book Canada
needs.
Turning to the particulars of the second edition, the authors
themselves note that it "holds to the basic structure of the first.
Many of its changes simply reflect developments between 1967 and
1975" (p. xvii). The work is divided into six parts and thirteen
chapters as follows:
I. TransnationalProblemswithin NationalLegal Systems
Chapter one covers responses of a national legal system to aliens
9. E.g., when discussing the interrelationship between international agreements
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and their activities. This chapter deals with immigration and
nationality and particularly matters involving the protection of
aliens under national law and alien access to economic activities. In
the American context, this means dealing with constitutional issues,
such as state control over aliens when in conflict with federal power
and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 10
and the federal power to deport" and exclude 12 aliens and restrict
access by aliens and naturalized citizens to federal jobs' 3 in the face
of the First and Fifth Amendments. The potential provincial/federal
conflict over regulation of alien activities was raised obliquely in
Canada in Morgan v. Attorney Generalfor PrinceEdward Island,
14 and it is likely that the Canadian Supreme Court will need to face
the issue whether the provinces should continue to be able to bar
entry to the professions and other areas of employment on the
grounds of alienage. 15 While the United States Supreme Court did
so under Equal Protection and Due Process, it might well have
proceeded also under the Supremacy Clause, holding that Congress
intended to occupy the field and exclude state enactments. ' 6 In the
Canadian context, our Supreme Court would have to find the
regulation of entry into various fields of employment by aliens as
concerning "Naturalization and Aliens" rather than a section 92
power, analogous to the route which the United States Supreme
Court did not choose to take.
and national law, the authors compare the American constitutional doctrine, under
which federal treaty power authorizes the central government to implement the
treaty with legislation over subject matter not normally open to it domestically,
with the Canadian situation, where the federal government may not legislate to
enforce treaty provisions trenching on provincial domain. Compare Missouri v.
Holland (1920), 252 U.S..416; 40 S. Ct. 382, with R. v Stuart, [1925] 1 D.L.R.
12; [1924] 3 W.W.R. 648 (Man. C.A.) and Labour Conventions Case
(Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (Ontario)), [1937] A.C. 326;
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.) (Can.)
10. E.g., Sugarman v. Dougall (1973), 413 U.S. 634; 93 S. Ct. 2842
11. Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy (1952), 342 U.S. 580; 72 S. Ct. 512
12. Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), 408 U.S. 753; 92 S. Ct. 2576
13. Hampton v. Wong (1976), 96 S. Ct. 1895; 48 L. Ed. 2d495
14. Morgan v. Attorney GeneralforPrinceEdward Island, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 349;
5 N.R. 455; 55 D.L.R. (3d) 527
15. Cf. In re Griffiths (1973), 413 U.S. 717; 93 S. Ct. 2851 (state could not bar
alien from practice of law solely on ground of citizenship)
16. Hsieh v. Civil Service Comm'n (1971), 79 Wash. 2d 529; 488 P. 2d 515;
Purdy v. State (1969), 71 Cal. 2d 566; 456 P. 2d 645. See also Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comnm'n (1948), 334 U.S. 410; 68 S. Ct. 1138; Trvay v. Raich (1915),
239 U.S. 33; 36S. Ct. 7
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Chapter two concerns the distribution of national powers for
dealing with transnational problems, first, within the federal
government (new material deals with the controversy over the
power of the executive in light of the Vietnam War) and, second, in
the federal structure, between the states and the central government
(e.g., the question whether state "Iron Curtain" statutes, regulating
distribution of local estates to residents in Communist countries,
7
tend to undermine the federal power over foreign affairs). 1
II. International Law and its Relationship to National Legal
Systems
Chapters three and four cover ground familiar to most International
Law casebooks. Chapter three, "Distinctive Characteristics of the
International Legal Process", adds material not contained in the
first edition on "jurisprudential issues about the nature of law and
its relationship to the economic and political order" (p. xviii). The
chapter discusses international tribunals, state protection of their
nationals (e.g., persons, 18 corporations,' 9 and the local exhaustion
principle, 20 the processes through which local law develops
(custom, treaties, and international organization influences), and
the conflict between local and International Law). Chapter four
illustrates the international legal process through an analysis of an
international minimum standard involving protection of the person,
expropriation of alien-owned property, 2 ' concession agreement
problems, and the Calvo Clause. Chapter five looks at the
interpenetration of national and International Law, again with
particular emphasis on the American position with respect to
customary International Law and international agreements before
the American courts. The latter area covers the constitutional status
of a treaty in the United States, types of treaties, and treaty
interpretation.
III. The Role of National Judiciariesin Building a Transnational
Legal System
Both because this is an American casebook and because it focuses
17. Zschernig v. Miller (1968), 389 U.S. 429; 88 S. Ct. 664
18. E.g., Nottebohm Case(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [195511 C.J. Rep. 4
19. E.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970]
I.C.J. Rep. 4
20. E.g., Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States of America), [1959]
I.C.J. Rep. 6
21. The authors added some fifteen new pages on the Chilean copper
expropriations.
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on private commercial affairs, there is a strong emphasis on the role
of courts in the transnational legal process. Chapter six, which
discusses litigational immunity of foreign sovereigns and the
American "Act of State" doctrine, has been reduced dramatically
in length on the sovereign immunity question in view of pending
statutory proposals. 22 Included under the "Act of State" section is
the European reaction to the Chilean copper expropriations, as well
as a tracing of the doctrine in American courts through and beyond
23
Sabbatino.
Chapter seven, "Civil Actions in a Transnational Setting", may
be considered by many more suited to a book on the Conflict of
Laws. The chapter compares jurisdiction to adjudicate and
recognition of foreign judgments in the United States and in a
number of European countries. It also looks at choice of forum
clauses, international commercial arbitration, and the obtaining of
foreign evidence for domestic civil use. Because the chapter takes
such a comparative law approach, it is not a repetition of the
Conflict of Laws course. Indeed, with students in many law schools
not electing to take Conflicts, inclusion of such a chapter is
indispensable in a course which lays such emphasis on private
international transations.
IV. The TransnationalReach of NationalLegal Systems
This part is divided into three chapters. Chapter eight looks at the
transnational reach of criminal legislation, chapter nine at economic
regulation, and chapter ten at income taxation. Chapter eight has
been expanded with emphasis on the development of the
International Law of crimes from Nuremberg through the Vietnam
War. Chapters nine and ten are vital to any Canadian lawyer
engaged in a practice involving the United States. The material first
notes the connection between modern American 'choice of law
methodology and statutory interpretation in many of the American
economic regulation cases. It then proceeds to analyse particular
statutory schemes and cases arising under them, such as maritime
regulations, anti-trust laws, and securities statutes. Chapter ten
22. Only recently enacted. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Publ. L.
94-583; 90 Stat. 2891
23. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964), 376 U.S. 398; 84 S. Ct. 923.
See also First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba (1972), 406 U.S.
759; 92 S. Ct. 1808 and Alfred Dunhill ofLondon, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba (1976),
96 S. Ct. 1854; 48 L. Ed. 2d 301
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gives a quick sketch of American questions of taxability of foreign
persons and laws controlling taxation of investments outside the
United States, an area of obvious concern to the Canadian lawyer.
V. Trade and Investment in the World Community: Legal
Structures, Policy Context and Case Studies; VI. The Developing
ProcessesofInternationalOrganizations
Chapter eleven discusses GATT and the IMF in a much more
shortened form than the first edition of the book, in favour of new
material on the multinational enterprise and international business
transactions in chapter twelve and the Common Market in chapter
thirteen, the latter taking in all Part VI. From a practising lawyer's
viewpoint, this was probably a wise decision. While the GATT and
IMF arrangements have undoubted impact upon transnational
commercial transactions, that impact is usually indirect; the private
lawyer rarely needs to consider those organizations in the manner
that he must examine, for instance, EEC Commission policy when
dealing with the Common Market. Relegation of the GATT/IMF to
background status is more consistent with the thrust of the rest of the
book.
Parts V and VI are specialised areas and need not necessarily be
included in a basic course on transnational legal problems. In fact,
Professor Vagts ended his consideration of the book in his basic
course with the transnational reach of national legal systems,
omitting the tax materials, and then used the more specialized
materials as background for a seminar on international business
transactions. The inclusion in the second edition of materials
studying typical distributorship and licensing agreements and the
international joint venture are undoubtedly outgrowths of materials
used in his advanced seminar.
The book is a long one, and the authors quite candidly suggest
pruning for use even in a course running as long as sixty hours.
Their approach tends to be problem-oriented, and they have
included challenging problems for the student (and teacher) with
which to wrestle during the class period. The problem approach can
be used effectively as the text covers a great deal of background
material, and the need for imparting information by lecture is
generally obviated.
TransnationalLegal Problems is unique, in that it serves well in
teaching and has continued usefulness as a general reference work.
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When I was first introduced to the book, many of my fellow
students were of the opinion that it was among the best that they had
had during their law school careers. I think that they were right,
and, taking a look at the second edition, what they said then still
holds true.
Michael T. Hertz
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University
InternationalLaw Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada.
By J. -G. Castel. 3d ed. Toronto: Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd.,
1976. Pp. xxxi, 1268. Price: $40.00
A third edition of any title, let alone a Canadian legal volume, is an
achievement. It shows staying power and thus, presumably, utility.
Professor Castel's International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and
Applied in Canadahas stayed the course now for eleven years. This
fact may cause some surprise, for his casebook has not apparently
been employed particularly widely by teachers in common law
schools. The third edition merits greater popularity.
Its strengths are easy to recount. First, it is up to date. In such a
fast moving field as international affairs, the latest teaching book
will automatically have an edge over its competitors simply by
collating the latest legal events and developments. Professor Castel
achieved the inclusion of materials through the second half of 1975.
Thus he has collected and edited, for example, important documents
on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (p. 73 ff.)
and the Informal Single Negotiating Text of UNCLOS III (p. 241

if.).
Secondly, the volume contains a great wealth of Canadian
experience and example. The importance of this material cannot be
overemphasized. International Law is truly an international subject
and knows no jurisdictional boundaries. Comparative national and
regional approaches to it should therefore be part of any university
course. It may seem paradoxical and parochial, then, to praise such
high Canadian content in Professor Castel's casebook. It is not so,
for two strong reasons.
As a practical matter, note must be taken that Canadian, not
international, students are the principal readers. Most of their
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experience and certainly all of their other legal education will have
been national, if not narrower. It will have been limited to a
Canadian or provincial jurisdiction. Against such background,
examples of Canadian involvement in world affairs are frequently
the best, if not the only, means to expand students' horizons and
understanding of the international legal system.
Moreover, for Canadians, knowledge of Canada's actions and
stances on International Law is of primary importance. Foreign
approaches and conflicting opinions must certainly be introduced
for a thoroughly international education. Indeed, the international
legal process cannot be understood without a knowledge of the
opposing viewpoints to be expected in the daily interactions of state
and diplomatic intercourse that constitute it. But the doctrinal
character of the subject, founded and still maintained on the basis of
sovereign national authority, continues to demand, perhaps
regrettably, that a national perspective be foremost.
The richness of Canadian material in Professor Castel's new
edition is therefore to be praised. It is, indeed, the only
commercially available collection of Canadian governmental
statements and court decisions on international matters. The
convenience of this compilation should not be underestimated.
Although the Department of External Affairs freely makes many
documents available, they are not prepared for convenient
classroom use. Nor can teachers and students all troop to Ottawa in
search of other materials. Professor Castel has made such an effort
and has edited a remarkably varied and insightful selection of
Canadian reports and documents.
But the third edition regrettably maintains old faults. It is far too
long. The thirteen hundred pages are crushing by their sheer weight,
let alone price. No standard length university course can employ all
this material. Moreover, so many pages have so much small print
that, as well as being hard to read, the volume would, if reset, be
easily half as long again.
Part of the problem of length continues to be attributable to
unnecessary repetition. Too often, too many illustrations of the
same point are given, as if a complete catalogue were necessary.
The error occurs as much over strings of cases on the same point,
such as the host of decisions on the implementation of treaties in
Canada (p. 973 ff.), as with repetitious examples of government
actions, for instance, the recognition of foreign states by Canada (p.
86ff.).
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Another and particularly irritating source of repetition is the
duplication of the same materials. A case, such as Le Gouvernement
de la Rdpublique Democratique du Congo v. Venne, 1 may be first
summarized and digested in some detail, often with judicial extracts
(p. 652ff.), and then immediately repeated in a full reproduction of
the actual report (p. 654ff.). Alternatively, when the same item,
such as Re Arrow River and TributariesSlide and Boom Co. Ltd. 2
(p. 33ff.), is relevant in a subsequent context, much of the material
is reworked rather than cross-referenced (p. 974 ff.). Once is
enough, and it is the editor's responsibility, not his readers', to
decide which version will best serve the purpose of his book.
Repetition is also one of the contributing factors to a continual
sense of textual uneveness. Many of Professor Castel's commentaries on the law are very suitable and incisive, but in some places
primary sources would be the better pedagogical choice. In other
places editorial comment is sorely lacking. The beginnings of
chapters may be cited. Professor Castel has a diffusing habit of first
listing all the other works that could be read on the particular subject
matter of a new chapter, while frequently failing to introduce it
himself at all before a welter of primary materials. The
bibliographies of references are invaluable but surely should be
placed at the ends of chapters. Introductory remarks to each chapter,
explaining its content and relation to previous ones, are essential to
provide continuity and direction for the reader. Lacking them, the
theme of the volume is hard to determine.
As a teaching vehicle, the materials are also flat. Contentious
comments are few, and questions and problems non-existent. The
teacher must provide all of these in class, which is no objection by
itself, but the student is given no line of enquiry or guide as to the
objective of his study preparatory to class. The materials settle too
stolidly to encourage his interest and inquiry.
No remarks are offered about Professor Castel's particular choice
of illustrative examples, other than Canadian, except to observe that
the leading authorities and documentation as traditionally accepted,
as well as some important new ones, are all included. Yet enough
critical comments have been made to suggest that further editing
would be rewarding. In sum, the third edition of Professor Castel's
casebook is a goldmine of contemporary International Law for
1. [1971] S.C.R. 997; 22 D.L.R. (3d) 669
2. (1931), 66 O.L.R. 577; [1931] 2 D.L.R. 216 (S.C., A.D.)
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Canadians but demands too much hard digging by both teacher and
student alike.
Hugh M. Kindred
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

InternationalLaw Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada.
3rd Edition, 1976, J. G. Castel
The Canadian student of International Law appears to a large extent
to be the poor parent in the family of common law lawyers. Thus,
he is often looked at with contempt by his brother and sister
lawyers. These ones fed on the Austinian tradition, believe that
International Law is not "hard" law and does not deserve, as such,
an importance equal to that of other subjects in the legal field of
study. Besides, and unlike the situation in other fields, there is very
little cooperation among Canadian international lawyers to
undertake a comprehensive study of the Canadian position in
International Law and relations and develop a Canadian perspective
or jurisprudence in this respect. As a consequence, the Canadian
student of International Law can only resent the absence of
Canadian materials to be used in relation to an introductory or
advanced course in his field of study. He must, therefore, rely to a
great extent on British, American or French materials and
"convert" their approach to the Canadian context. In this respect, it
should be noted that although transnational by definition,
International Law principles are developed and received by
sovereign states and that the interests of these states as well as their
jurisprudential background influence their participation in the
development of an international legal system. Canada in this matter
still has a great deal to do.
The above developments explain that the Canadian student of
International Law, in his loneliness comparable to that of a long
distance runner, endlessly awaits the publication of new materials in
his area of study with great expectancy.
Professor Castel's third edition of InternationalLaw, Cases and
MaterialsChiefly as Interpretatedin Canada purports to fulfill this
expectancy and remedy the lack of International Law materials in
Canada.
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As its title indicates, Professor Castel has followed the practice
developed in the United States by Professor C. Hyde as early as
1922.1 Hence, his new casebook puts an emphasis on "the
problems which most frequently arise in the Canadian practice of
International Law and conduct of International Relations" (see
Preface). The reader will thus find in this work an abundance of
Canadian cases and documents as well as a great deal of other
relevant materials from various origins.
The organization of Professor Castel's book is rather classical in
scope: It includes chapters dealing respectively with: Definitions,
nature and sources of International Law (ch. 1); Authority and
application of International Law (ch. 2); The domain of
International Law (ch. 3); Subjects of International Law (ch. 4);
Forms of state jurisdiction (ch. 5); Territory of states (ch. 6);
Nationality and individuals in International Law (ch. 7); Extent of
State jurisdiction (ch. 8); The law of treaties (ch. 11); State
responsibility (ch. 12); Peaceful settlement of international disputes
(ch. 13). However, the author also explores some relatively new
areas of International Law, such as the international -protection of
the environment (ch. 9); as well as the conservation of the living
resources of the sea and air (ch. 10).
The thirteen chapters of the book (1251 pages altogether) are
preceded by a table of cases and followed by a short selected
Canadian bibliography which is designed to complete the reading
list found in relation to each individual chapter of the book. Finally,
comes an index which, although insufficiently detailed, is still
helpful for the reader to find his way through the jungle of materials
with which he is confronted.
Seen as a whole, Professor Castel's work is thus an invaluable
addition to Canadian literature in International Law and his efforts
deserve to be praised in this respect.
However, a number of weaknesses must be emphasized in
relation to this monumental piece of work: Thus, from an
organizational viewpoint, Professor Castel's work presents some
elements of confusion which force the reader to constantly shift
back and forth from chapter to chapter in order to acquire a precise
picture of the given area. This problem arises especially with
respect to chapters 2 and 11 as well as to chapters 6 and 8. In these
1. C. Hyde, InternationalLaw Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United
States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1922)
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divisions the breakdown of topics is somewhat controversial. It
seems, for instance, that the question of the relationship between
treaties and municipal law should logically be covered in chapter 2,
if only for the purpose of maintaining a certain balance between the
proportions of these respective chapters (12 pages for chapter 2 vs.
158 for chapter 11). Also, Professor Castel covers the questions of
the right of innocent passage through straits under existing
principles of International Law as well as the new concept of transit
right through straits under the R.S.N.T. (pp. 255-261) before
dealing with the notion of innocent passage itself (pp. 558-579 and
585-591). Along the same lines, the concept of patrimonial sea (pp.
269-278) is developed before the notions of high seas (pp. 617-645)
and contiguous zone (pp. 591-617). In more than one instance,
repetitions and even contradictions result from the deficient
organization of the materials presented. This is notably so with
respect to the question of the legal status of Arctic waters. In this
particular case, however, the confusion noted can be partially
explained on the basis of a lack of consistency in the Canadian
position on this question.
In this respect, one must deplore the scarcity of personal notes
which could tie the various parts of the book together and provide a
useful thread for the reader to follow.
Furthermore and although a certain subjectivity is inevitable in
complications such as the one under review, a certain unbalance in
the scope of the constituent chapters of the book is to be noted.
Thus, if essential topics such as those covered in chapters 1, 2, 3
total only 46 pages, others such as those dealing with environmental
protection (chapters 10 and 11) amount to some 200 pages. This
disproportion seems hardly in accordance with the express goal of
the author to provide for a book "which is designed for use by
Canadian law students in an introductory course in International
Law". (see Preface) One cannot help to think here that the author
has been forced for quantitative reasons to neglect fundamental
areas of International Law to give in to the temptation of covering
current topics. The problem with this approach is that students may
not realize the necessity of exploring the substance of the
introductory chapters in which the core principles of International
Law are laid out. On the contrary, they may concentrate on
questions which are less legal than political and whose intensity
fluctuates with the state of international relations. In this respect, it
is noteworthy that only a few pages have been devoted to
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international terrorism (pp. 194-199 and 201-203).
Again, it is submitted with respect to sources of International
Law, that the choice of cases presented to illustrate the conditions
necessary to the crystalization of a custom is a controversial one.
Indeed, the excerpts from cases reported here2 are all negative
examples of the existence of such conditions and in each case the
establishment of a general or regional custom is rejected. It appears
here that the inclusion of a case such as the "right of passage" case 3
would have offered simultaneously an example where the I.C.J.
recognized the existence of a custom which had developed from the
practice of states and the non-existence of another. In this respect, it
must be emphasized that if customs do not play anymore a primary
role in the International Law making process "(w)hat gives
international custom its special value and its superiority over
is the fact that, developing by
conventional institutions ........
4
spontaneous practice, it reflects a deeply felt community of law."
Moreover, a number of errors of a more or less serious nature can
be spotted throughout the book. For instance, the reference on p.
252 is not in relation to regulations adopted pursuant to the
Fisheries Act and covering Hudson Bay as alleged,. but relates to
regulations concerning the pilotage district of Montreal. 5 Also, a
careful examination of the table of cases will show that excerpts
from the Scott case, on the reciprocal enforcement of maintenance
orders, can be found on p. 924. In fact, the said excerpts are located
on p. 928 when a mere mention of the Scott case is to be found on p.
924. Besides, the reference on p. 924 indicates that this case was
decided in 1952 where the judgement of the Supreme Court was
rendered in 1955 and reported in 1956. In the same vein, a glimpse
at the index under the heading of "Terrorism" refers to p. 1074 of
the book in which the reader will find no mention of this question.
Finally, the prohibitive price of the book under review ($40) may
in itself discourage students from electing an optional course which
is often considered to have little practical relevance for the common
law lawyer.
2. North Sea ContinentalShelf Case (FederalRepublic of Germany v. Denmark;
FederalRepublic of Germany v. The Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. 3; Asylum Case
(Columbia v. Peru), [1950] I.C.J. 266; The Lotus (France v. Turkey), [1927]
P.C.I.J. Publications, Series A, No. 10
3. Right ofPassageover Indian Territory(Portugalv. India) [ 1960] I.C.J. 6
4. C. De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, trans. P.
Corbett (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968) at 161
5. S.O.R., 1955, Vol. 2, 1433 and 1440
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In the final analysis, it is submitted that although a major
contribution in the publication of Canadian materials in International Law, Professor Castel's new casebook lacks the qualities
required to become a classic in its field.
Claude C. Emmanuelli
School of Law
University of New Brunswick

Whose Law? What Order? A conflict approach to criminology.
Edited by William J. Chambliss and Milton Mankoff. New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Pp. xiv, 256 Price: $6.95 (paper)
Anthologies of previously published articles are appearing with
ever greater frequency, particularly in the field of criminal justice.
Although they take many forms these anthologies tend either to be
general, in the sense that they attempt to reflect a wide variety of
perspectives, or specific, in that they focus upon the presentation of
one particular perspective. Whose Law? What Order? A conflict
approach to criminology is an example of the latter. Designed for
use in sociology and criminology courses as a supplement to the
basic texts and anthologies it seeks to outline the general approach
of the "conflict" or "radical" criminologists to criminal justice
issues. Given the audience which it contemplates the book is, I
think, successful in meeting its objective.
Before I comment more specifically on the book I might usefully
give a brief outline of the debate currently taking place in
criminology; for it is from this debate that this collection of articles
springs. The point in dispute is straightforward enough - does
consensus or conflict more accurately characterize social organization in modern western democratic societies? The consensus view
suggests that within such societies there is widespread agreement on
fundamental cultural, structural and organizatiofial values. The
content of the criminal law, for example, reflects that fundamental
agreement. When conflicts of interest do arise the state is seen as
having the capacity to act as a neutral arbiter, assessing the conflict
in the light of the public interest and proposing some solution which
best gives effect to that interest. Within the pluralistic society, then,
there is equality (in the sense that any interest may be represented)
or at least the potential for equality. The conflict view, on the other
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hand, suggests that society is characterized not by agreement but by
discord, not by reconciliation but by dominance and subjugation.
Those who have access to power are concerned to maintain their
position and use the law as one means of achieving this. The
criminal law, then, simply reflects the concerns of the powerful.
This debate is not, of course, a new one; nor is it confined to
criminology. Yet it has had a profound effect upon the subject.
Criminologists have traditionally been consensus theorists - not
explicitly so, perhaps, but their work is consistent with no other
theoretical view. In the past most criminologists have concentrated
their energies upon those convicted of crime, studying them in an
effort to identify the factors giving rise to their criminality. Once
these factors were identified, they thought, effective techniques for
dealing with the criminal behaviour of individual offenders, and
with crime in general, could be devised. Criminologists have found
the "causes" of criminal behaviour in many places - in the
criminal's physical structure, his psyche, his personality, his
immediate environment and occasionally in the wider social
environment. In attempting this "technical" analysis criminologists
left largely unchallenged the values enshrined in the criminal law.
In refusing to examine these values critically and in applying
themselves to the task of making offenders adjust to the prevailing
value system criminologists effectively committed themselves to the
existing social structure. It is this commitment that the conflict
criminologists challenge.
Now to the book. It begins with a general introductory essay by
one of the editors, Chambliss, (who, incidentally, wrote three of the
ten articles which follow). In this introduction he outlines the
essential differences between the consensus theorists ("represented" by Emile Durkheim) and the conflict theorists ("represented" by Karl Marx) and seeks to demonstrate through the use
of historical "evidence" that the conflict theory is the more
accurate. In this latter aspect of his essay he anticipates,
unnecessarily in my view, some of the later articles. Following this
introduction the book is divided into three parts. To each part there
is an introduction, written by the co-editor, Mankoff.
Part One, containing three articles, focuses upon the way in
which the criminal law is formulated. As I have already mentioned,
the consensus theorist views the criminal law as protecting those
values which are agreed upon by a majority in the society to be
fundamental whereas the conflict theorist sees it as protecting the
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interests of the powerful to the detriment of the powerless. The
articles attempt to supply data supporting the conflict view. The first
article analyses the factors leading to the development of the
criminal law in western society, the second examines the
formulation of particular criminal laws in their historical context,
namely laws dealing with vagrancy, and the third discusses a more
recent example of law formulation, namely federal legislation in the
United States dealing with drugs.
Part Two deals with law enforcement. Several case studies are
used to identify the ways in which the criminal law is differentially
enforced. The articles seek to demonstrate how law enforcement
agencies protect the powerful by focusing their efforts upon the
powerless. The consensus theorist would, of course, see law
enforcement agencies as essentially impartial administrators of the
law ,and would argue that more people in lower socio-economic
groups are dealt with by criminal justice agencies because people
from these groups commit the majority of serious crimes.
The final part of the book deals with specific examples of
criminal behaviour in American society and seeks to establish that
they are the inevitable products of the overall political, social and
economic structure in the United States. For example, street crime
is seen as "a natural outgrowth of capitalist society". (p. 191)
1I will not examine each of the articles in the book in detail nor
will I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical
perspective which they advance. Rather I confine myself to three
general comments.
First, the articles (all American) come from a variety of sources
(from, for example, the Wisconsin Law Review, Society, Catalyst,
the New York Times Review of Books and Ramparts) and so differ
greatly in approach and style. Some are extensively footnoted,
others contain no footnotes. Their quality is uneven. In accordance
with the editors' intentions, these are not the "classic" articles in
the field. Nevertheless, taken as a group, they are provocative and
do present the conflict perspective in an interesting and stimulating
fashion. I should emphasize here that the articles provide a critical
analysis of the current system - they do not propose alternatives or
give any detailed indication of what flows from acceptance of the
conflict perspective.
Second, the editors intrude but a little, as editors, into the
presentation of the arguments by the authors of the articles. They
reproduce the articles in full with little or no editorial -change.
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Mankoff's introductions to Part One and Two are simply brief
summaries of what appears in the articles and are of little value. His
introduction to Part Three is more extensive and more helpful.
Further, when in his introductory essay Chambliss outlines the
consensus theory he simply reproduces a page or so from an article
which he published in the Wisconsin Law Review in 1971. This
same article is reproduced in Part One of the book. Thus the
consensus theory is outlined at two different points in identical
terms - an unnecessary and annoying piece of repetition. All this
may suggest that the editors did not apply themselves with any great
vigor to their editorial tasks.
Third, while the book will undoubtedly give the reader a feel for
the debate, as well as some understanding of the conflict
perspective, it is unlikely, I think, to persuade anyone to one view
or the other. The analysis of historical and modem material is, in
many ways, fascinating but it is at most suggestive. This
"evidence" could be quite adequately explained by an adherent of
the consensus view in a way that is quite consistent with that view.
Furthermore, the consensus theorist could point to other events
which might suggest that the conflict view is not an adequate
explanation of social organization. He might, for example, argue
that the ultimate resolution of the Watergate matter indicates the
potential strength of representative government in a modem state
and does not lend itself-to ready explanation in terms of the conflict
theory. The point is that, while it is true that "facts kick", at least
occasionally, most of us view the world through a lens of
ideological beliefs and assumptions. The way in which we react to
this book, then, will depend upon the nature of the lens through
which we view it.
Terence Arnold
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

